l. INTRODUCTIO N Efficiency principles are no guide to optimal tax rates when income redistributio n is the purpose of that taxation. Optimal tax rates for redistributio n must be obtained through maximizatio n of a social welfare function constrained by technology and by what Pigou called the "announcem ent effects" of the tax. "Announcem ent effects" refer to the alterations in the economic behavior of individuals induced by the tax scheme, which appear as constraints upon collective choice because they arise from individual utility-maxi mizing behavior that society cannot or will not inhibit. When redistribution is accomplishe d through lump sum transfers, announceme nt effects are assumed to be nil, and the problem of the distribution branch of government 1 -equating everyone's marginal social utility of income -is transparent. Mirrlees 2 has attempted an analytic solution for the optimal income tax by maximizing a utilitarian social welfare function constrained to allow for the incentive effects of the tax upon work effort. Phelps 3 and Sheshinski 4 repeated this calculation for the Rawls social welfare function, and Fair 5 did a similar analysis for a social welfare function written as the product of individual utilities. This article develops a simulation technique for calculating the optimal income tax under any social welfare function whatsoever; calculations are actually made for seven different social welfare functions. We are able to compare optimal marginal taxes under different social welfare functions, and our calcula·-tions are higher than those obtained by Mirrlees and Sheshinski. Our technique also allowed us to impute the social welfare function implicit in the actual redistribution accomplished by government in the United States.
II. FORMULATING THE PROBLEM
We formulate the problem of optimal income taxation for redistribution as a partial equilibrium analysis in which the wage rate for each individual is fixed. Individuals obtain pretax income by a sacrifice of leisure, and the rate at which an individual can transform leisure into income is determined by his productive skill. We distinguish individuals by their level of productive skill, which is indicated by n; and distributed according to J(n;). 6 Letting l=pro-portion of time spent working, we write the pretax income of type-i individual as y;,= n;l,. His tax bill is t (n;l,), and his utility is U[n;l,-t(n;l,), 1-l.] . 7 Selecting the optimal tax rate is a matter of choosing t( ·) to maximize the social welfare function subject to the constraint that the budget of the redistributing authority is balanced and each individual selects his utility-maximizing combination of leisure and labor: and max W(U1, ... , Um) subject to
Increases in the marginal tax rate induce two contradictory effects that are assigned different weight by different social welfare functions. As the marginal tax rate increases, the excess burden due to distortion of the labor-leisure relationship increases for everyone. However, higher tax revenues allow more income to be redistributed to the poor through a subsidy (negative taxation), thus augmenting the income of those whose marginal utility of income is highest. The social optimum occurs where the marginal social cost of an increase 6. f (n,) is the proportion of individuals with productive skill n,, which is a discrete approximation to a continuous distribution.
7. We assume that all individuals have the same utility function in net income and leisure. in the burden of higher marginal tax rates just equals the marginal social value of an increase in the subsidy.
If productive skill were a consequen ce of innate ability and innate ability could be identified, a tax could be levied on productive skill that would be unavoidab le and hence nondistort ing. The firstbest solution is ability taxation, which requires that the tax authorities know the ability level of each individual . If there is ability taxation, the individual has an incentive to misreprese nt his productive skill, which would be an easy thing to do in the upper income brackets. The income tax approach requires that the authorities know the distributio n of productive skill but not the skill levels of particular individual s. The income tax approach implicitly assumes that it is more efficient for the tax authorities to distort the work-leisu re relationship than provide an incentive for misreprese nting productive skill.
We solve the optimizati on problem for seven different social welfare functions, which we name "Rawls," "Elitist," "Bentham ," "Nash," "Egalitari an," Democrat ic," and "max GNP." The Rawls point is located where the utility of the individual whose ability is least attains its maximum,8 and the Elitist point maximizes the utility of the most able.9 The Bentham point occurs where the unweighted sum of utilities is greatest, and the Nash point maximizes their unweighte d product. The Democrati c criterion maximizes the utility of the class of median ability. The Egalitaria n point minimizes the Gini coefficient defined on net income, and the max GNP maximizes the average income level. The latter two social welfare functions are not written over final utilities, but are useful for characteri zing the efficiency-equality trade-off.
These specificati ons of the social welfare function place bounds upon the solution to the optimizati on problem. The Rawls criterion implies that returns to scale diminish so rapidly that only the lowest utility group need be considered ; the Elitist criterion implies that returns to scale increase so rapidly that only the highest utility group need be considered ; the Bentham and Nash points represent intermedia te cases. If the individual were in the "original position" 9. In this model there is a perfect correlation between the ranking of individuals by utility and productive skill. When only income is taxed, a person of higher ability can always obtain at least as much utility as a person of lower ability by earning the same income and paying the same tax but working a smaller proportion of the time. The exception to this generalizati on is that a 100 percent tax rate, which prevents anyone from working at all, will result in every ability class obtaining the same utility level, since all utility is from leisure.
of social contract theory,1° where he is ignorant of his own productive skill, expected utility maximization would compel him to pick the tax-subsidy schedule that maximizes the unweighted sum of utilities.11 He would choose the Rawls, Bentham, Nash, or Elitist point -or some point in between -depending upon his risk preferences.12 One may use social contract theory to argue for the moral superiority of one social welfare function over another, but theories of self-interested choice need not predict that individuals will do what is moral. The median voting rule predicts that the Democratic social welfare function will be maximized in the actual government redistribution activity if tax rates are set by majority voting over paired alternatives, assuming that preferences are singlepeaked. 13 Solution of the maximization problem as we formulated it becomes possible once one specifies manageable functional forms for the utility function and the tax function. We experimented with a variety of such forms but found a CES utility function 14 14. We use a constant returns to scale utility function for the following reason: Any monotonic transformation of the individual utility function will not influence the labor-leisure choice, but will affect the weights by which utilities are combined in the social welfare function. Since the role of the social welfare function is to impose a conception of economic justice upon the distribution of observed utilities, we assume constant returns to scale for individual utility functions and leave the social welfare function to determine the appropriate weights for combining them. The labor-leisure combinations admitted by the analysis are circumscribed by the linear homogeneity of the Engel curves for the CES utility function. .5B (n1li +n2l2) and l\=g+A(g -1)/n;(l-B ) for i=l.2. Once the tax parameter B is given and the ability levels are known, we can solve immediately for l\ and U•. We wrote a computer program that solved for U 1 and U 2 and varied B from 0.0 to 0.9, and thus we identified the utility frontier for positive B's. The utility frontier is shown in Figure I for the case where g = 1/2 and the u' FIGURE I g=5; highest ability=5; lowest ability=!.
It is also interesting to note that Mirrlees (op. cit.) found that the optimal tax function under the utilitarian social welfare function was almost linear. ability levels of the two individuals are n1 = 1 and n2 = 5. The points on the frontier that are optima under the various social welfare functions are labeled. Table I shows how the optimal marginal tax rate varied for each social welfare function in the two-person case as the highest ability level and the exponent on consumption (g) increased. 17 We can make two generalizations from the two-person case that apply to U.S. data: (1) Social welfare functions typically preserved their rank by size of the optimal marginal tax rate as the distribution of ability changed or as the parameters of the utility function changed. The ranking from high to low was typically Rawls~Nash~ Bentham~Elitist, (2) The optimal marginal tax rate was at least as high under a less equal distribution of skill as under a more equal one, regardless of which social welfare function was chosen. The first generalization suggests that Mirrlees would have found higher marginal tax rates if he had used some social welfare function different from the Bentham criterion in making his calculations. The second generalization implies that those who believe productive skills are unevenly distributed ought to favor higher tax rates under any 17. The lower ability level equals 1 and is kept constant. particula r social welfare function than someone else who believes that productiv e skills are more equally distribut ed.
IV. SIMULATI ON ON U. S. DATA
There seems to be no strictly correct assumpti on about the distribution of productiv e skills so we proceede d by a sensitivi ty analysis. One extreme assumpti on is that productiv e skill is distributed with a skew to the right like income prior to governm ent redistrib ution activity. Musgrav e has estimate d the redistrib utive impact of federal, state, and local governm ent taxation and expenditure, so we used his data to estimate what the distribut ion of income would be without such activity. Our other extreme assumpti on is that productiv e skill has a tight normal distributi on, as suggested by some tests of basic ability ( e.g., IQ). Our moderate assumpti on is that ability is distributed as wages per hour worked, for which we obtained data from a study by Hall. 18 The simulation was made for elasticities of substitution varying from 0.1 to 2.0, and for coefficients on consumption varying from 0.1 to 0.9. 19 Extreme values of the elasticity of substitution and the consumption coefficient gave results for which the average income of each bracket or the hours worked exceeded sensible limits. Results are reported in Table II tution, but the consumption coefficient is one half throughout this table. The two generalizations obtained in the two-person case are seen to apply to this table: the ranking of the social welfare functions defined over final utilities is preserved as the parameters of the utility function and ability distribution change, and a more unequal distribution of skills implies at least as high an optimal marginal tax rate under any particular social welfare function as a less unequal distribution. The behavior of the optimal marginal tax rate under a given social welfare function is not monotonic with the elasticity of substitution, as can be seen in Figure II .
In Figure III we observe that there is a trade-off between GNP and equality as measured by the Gini coefficient in the case where ability is distributed normally. For example, moving from the The solid line is the Rawls criterion using pregovernment income distribution for abilities. The line composed of short dashes is the Bentham criterion using pregovernment income distribution for abilities. The line composed of long dashes is the Rawls criterion using normal income distribution for abilities. The double line is the Bentham criterion using normal income distribution for abilities. Bentham point to the Rawls point results in a decline in the Gini coefficient and a fall in income per capita. However, this trade-off breaks down when the elasticity of substitution is less than 1 and ability is distributed as pregovernment income, as can be seen in .700
Ability distributed as pregovernme nt income. Elasticity= 1/3. Numbers in brackets indicate the optimal marginal tax rate.
marginal tax rate is set at 0.95 ! This can be explained by the fact that with low elasticity and ability distributed as pregovernment income the more able persons increased work as the marginal tax rose. Apparently one's intuition is not always a good predictor of actual outcomes in this model. Musgrave (see Appendix) estimated the effect of government redistribution activity under a best assumption and under an assumption most favorable to tax and expenditure progressivity. By regressing his estimate of postgovernment income upon pregovernment income, one obtains an estimate of total government redistributive activity according to our model t(y;,) = -A+By,, where y;, is one of ten income brackets. The results. of GLS for Musgrave's best assumption and most progressive assumption were t(y;,) = -1623+0.12y;, (best assumption) and t (y;,) = -7781 +0.57y;, (most progressive assumption).
We impute the social welfare function by determining which of our seven social welfare functions requires a marginal tax rate close to that found in the equations above. We eliminate all cases where the optimal solution requires a marginal tax rate that differs from the estimated one by more than = ±0.15 or a fixed transfer that differs from the estimated one by more than = ±$1,650. We also eliminate from consideration all cases in which the resulting average family income and share of time worked (in the optimal solution) fall outside the limits $10,000-$25,000 and 0.2-0.5, respectively.
The implicit social welfare functions under each of the assumptions about the distribution of productive skills that passed both tests are given in Table III . Caution should be exercised in applying these results because of the substantial margin of error in their calculation, but the fact that the implicit social welfare function is Democratic under Musgrave's best assumption on distributional • We refer to the estimates of the actual government redistribution under Musgrave's "best" and "most progressive" assumptions.
effect of governmen t activity and the assumptio n that ability is distributed as wages per hour -perhaps the best assumptio n on distribution of ability -vindicates the median rule.20
The distributiv e branch of governmen t must calculate the income tax for optimal redistribut ion by maximizin g a social welfare function constraine d by technology and the announcem ent effects of the tax. A partial equilibrium analysis that takes into account the announcem ent effect upon work effort 21 shows that the marginal tax rate that is optimal for any particular social welfare function increases with inequality in the distributio n of productive skill. The ranking of social welfare functions by size of optimal marginal tax rate was Rawls;;::N ash;;::Bent ham;;::Elit ist, regardless of the distribution of productive skill or the elasticity of substitutio n. The inverse of this ranking did not always correspond to the ranking of social welfare functions by the size of the Gini coefficient. The social welfare function implicit in actual U. S. governmen t transfer activity under Musgrave 's best assumptio n and the intermedia te ability distributio n was Democrati c, as predicted by the median rule.
APPENDIX: DATA ON DISTRIBUT ION OF ABILITIES
Musgrave established ten money factor income brackets and used data obtained from the Brookings Institution and the Census Bureau to calculate the proportion of families and unrelated individuals falling into each bracket. (First row of Table IV) . Nonmonetary income (primarily unrealized capital gains) was then imputed to each bracket under several different assumptio ns. All federal, state, and local governmen t taxation and expenditur e was distributed to the various income brackets under several assumptions. The result gave the pregovern ment income and postgovernment income for each bracket, which appears in rows 2, 3, and 4 in Table IV . 22 From the Musgrave calculation s we selected the 20. Substantial differences in optimal marginal tax rates under the Democratic and Rawls criteria are indicative of a conflict of interest between lowand middle-abil ity groups.
21. A general analysis would take account of the effect of taxation upon savings, capital formation, and the distribution of productive skill.
22. The data in Table IV in the Appendix are obtained by a minor  transformat ion of data found in row 1 of table 2, rows 40 and 42 of Table 7 , and rows 53 and 54 of assumpti ons that most increased the skew in pregover nment income to obtain row 2 in Table IV . Postgove rnment income for each of the ten brackets was used in the regressio ns reported on page 667. For the normal distribut ion we used a truncated distribut ion with mean of $10,000 and standard deviation of $1,000, from which we calculate d the average income in each of the percentag e brackets. The results are given in row 5 of Table IV. Robert Hall obtained his data on wage per hour from the SEO sample, and they are reproduc ed as Table V . 23 All the data on the 
